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THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS:
SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT & CAROLYN SHAPIRO
The Supreme Court and its Justices have a conflicted relationship with 
American politics. The Justices like to see themselves as above the political 
fray, making their decisions on the basis of principle, not politics—and 
certainly not partisanship. They extol the value of judicial deference to the 
democratic process. Politicians too invoke this idealized vision of an apolit-
ical Court when it serves their political interests. Yet the Court frequently 
decides cases involving politics—often with clear partisan implications. 
The Justices strike down democratically enacted laws. And politicians reg-
ularly place the Court and its decisions at the heart of political debates. The 
contributions in this Symposium issue provide new insights into this con-
flicted relationship. They diagnose how these conflicts arose, critique their 
consequences, and suggest ways in which the relationship might be im-
proved.
America’s elected officials, from the first days of the Republic 
through today, have debated, denounced, and praised the Supreme Court 
and particular Justices. When the Court hands down a controversial deci-
sion, politicians make speeches and issue statements of condemnation or 
praise. When the Court constrains elected officials’ authority, they warn of 
the tyranny of unelected judges. Sometimes they are moved to action, call-
ing for constitutional amendments, passing corrective statutes, or issuing 
defiant resolutions.1 Sometimes they tack in the other direction, calling on 
the Court to resolve controversial issues—perhaps because they would 
prefer to avoid those issues themselves. In these instances, politicians de-
mand, in essence, that the Court relieve them of politically difficult choic-
es.2
1. See, e.g., Jason  Mazzone,  Above Politics: Congress and the Supreme Court in 2017, 93  CHI.-
KENT L. REV. ___ (2018) (discussing congressional responses to Court decisions).
2. See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: 
THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007); 
Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. 
POL. DEV. 35  (1993).
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The political process also periodically places the Court at center stage. 
During the modern multi-day, televised confirmation hearings, the Ameri-
can people hear senators talk, often at length, about the Court.3 At election 
time, the future of the Court is a perennial if sporadic issue, particularly in 
presidential campaigns.4 Politicians, in short, have ample opportunity to 
comment on, fight with, and sing the praises of the Supreme Court.
The Justices play their own role in this on-again, off-again relationship 
between the Court and American politics. To start their career on the high 
court, all of the Justices must navigate the political gauntlet of nomination 
and confirmation. Some Justices continue to engage with political actors 
after they are confirmed, through extrajudicial appearances and statements.
Such activities have long been controversial, especially when they have a 
ideological or partisan valence.5 Justice Ginsburg’s comments deriding 
Donald Trump in the midst of the 2016 campaign, for example, were met 
with widespread condemnation.6 And Justice Gorsuch has already been 
criticized for his appearances at Republican events.7
By far the most direct way in which the Court engages with American 
politics, however, is in the form of cases in which litigants call on the Jus-
tices to decide questions that implicate politics. Indeed, some scholars and 
lawyers argue that overseeing the democratic process—“reinforcing” the 
representative system8—is the most important role the Court plays. Since 
the 1960s, the Justices have taken up the call to extend judicial oversight 
over electoral politics with increasing frequency, expanding the right to 
vote,9 requiring legislatures to redraw electoral district lines,10 striking 
down campaign finance regulations.11 In 2000, the Court played a critical 
3. See Carolyn Shapiro, What Members of Congress Say About the Supreme Court and Why It 
Matters, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. ___ (2018).
4. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The Forgotten Issue? The Supreme Court and the 2016 Presi-
dential Campaign, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. ___ (2018).
5. See Richard L. Hasen, Celebrity Justice: Supreme Court Edition, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 157
(2016); Christopher W. Schmidt, Beyond the Opinion: Supreme Court Justices and Extrajudicial 
Speech, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 487 (2013).
6. See Christopher W. Schmidt, How to Think About Justice Ginsburg’s Trump Comments,
ISCOTUSNOW (July 14, 2016), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/iscotus/think-justice-ginsburgs-trump-
comments/ [https://perma.cc/N58R-XUCV].
7. See Garrett Epps, America’s Red and Blue Judges, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/americas-red-and-blue-judges/540924/ 
[https://perma.cc/7L2F-V9BJ].
8. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (offering the seminal articulation of the “representation-reinforcing” theory of judicial review).
9. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
10. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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role in deciding a presidential election.12 More recently, a sharply divided 
Court struck down a key provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act13 and the
Justices are now considering whether to venture back into the “political 
thicket”14 of partisan gerrymandering.15
Recent political developments underscore the timeliness of this Sym-
posium’s examination of the relationship between the Supreme Court and 
American politics. Justice Scalia’s death in February 2016 and the refusal 
of Senate Republicans to hold confirmation hearings for Judge Merrick 
Garland, President Obama’s nominee to fill the vacancy, meant that the 
Supreme Court loomed particularly large over the 2016 election.16 Trump 
took the unprecedented step of releasing a list of proposed nominees,17 and
advocacy groups pushed the future of the Court as a central issue of the 
election.18 In the end, nearly a quarter of all voters identified the Supreme 
Court as the most important issue in the election, and such voters were 
more likely to vote for Donald Trump than for Hillary Clinton.19 Indeed,
many conservatives who were wary about Trump justified their vote for 
him by citing the Court.20
To the satisfaction of these wary conservatives, one of President
Trump’s first major actions was nominating Neil Gorsuch to fill Justice 
Scalia’s seat on the Court. The Senate confirmation battle that followed 
reflected the fraught political landscape of the Supreme Court and Ameri-
can politics. Democrats solidly opposed Gorsuch’s nomination. Republi-
cans responded by changing Senate rules to eliminate the filibuster for 
Supreme Court confirmations, thus allowing confirmation with only a bare 
majority of Senate support.21
Trump’s election has brought other changes to the relationship be-
tween the Supreme Court and American politics. As a candidate and now 
as President, Trump has vigorously attacked judges and courts. During his 
12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
13. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
14. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion).
15. Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (mem.).
16. See generally Schmidt, supra note 4.
17. See id. at [123–24].
18. See id. at [134].
19. NBC News Exit Poll: Future Supreme Court Appointments Important Factor in Presidential 
Voting, NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016, 6:12 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/card/nbc-news-exit-poll-
future-supreme-court-appointments-important-factor-n680381 [https://perma.cc/STB7-GCCJ].
20. See Schmidt, supra note 4, at [135–36] & nn. 205–07.
21. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-
court-senate.html [https://perma.cc/XGC8-F65E].
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campaign, he accused a federal judge who ruled against him of being bi-
ased, calling this American-born judge a “Mexican.”22 In office, he has 
denounced judges who ruled against him as “so-called judges.”23 Trump 
also deploys the Court as a political lever. He used ex-Supreme Court Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens’s proposal to repeal the Second Amendment24 as an 
opportunity to issue a partisan call to arms: “We need more Republicans in 
2018 and must ALWAYS hold the Supreme Court!”25
Although there is nothing new about politicians using the Court for 
political advantage,26 it may have new implications in our current moment 
of hyperpolarization of public life. Political debates about the Court have 
become harsher, blunter, and more partisan. In this context, it is more im-
portant than ever to have a clear picture of the past and present status of 
this relationship. It is more important than ever to better understand the 
risks and opportunities of the current moment. This is precisely what the 
contributors to this Symposium seek to do.
Several Symposium contributors focus on the politicians’ side of the 
relationship and the impact of political actors on the Court. Kevin McMah-
on identifies and analyzes the novel phenomenon of the “minority Justice”: 
a Justice produced by a nomination and confirmation process in institutions 
that do not actually represent national majorities.27 A Justice can be ap-
pointed by a President who did not win the popular vote; Justice Gorsuch is 
the most recent example. But also sitting on the current Court are the only 
three Justices in history confirmed by such narrow margins that the sena-
tors who voted to confirm them collectively received fewer votes than the 
senators who voted against them. The Senate’s abandonment of the filibus-
ter for Supreme Court nominations makes it even more likely that future 
Justices will be approved by senators whose constituencies make up less 
22. Maureen Groppe, What Trump Has Said About Judge Curiel, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (June 11, 
2016, 11:53 AM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/06/11/what-trump-has-said-judge-
curiel/85641242/ [https://perma.cc/6FXZ-JATH].
23. Amy B. Wang, Trump Lashes Out at ‘So-Called Judge’ Who Temporarily Blocked Travel 
Ban, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/trump-
lashes-out-at-federal-judge-who-temporarily-blocked-travel-ban/? [http://perma.cc/3TD5-CGYZ]; 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976 [http://perma.cc/ZU67-KSAR].
24. John Paul Stevens, Opinion, Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-second-amendment.html 
[http://perma.cc/759Y-3TMQ].
25. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 28, 2018, 2:52 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/978932860307505153 [https://perma.cc/4BPK-XEC2].
26. See, e.g., KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM 
AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (2011).
27. Kevin J. McMahon, Will the Supreme Court Still “Seldom Stray Very Far”?: Regime Politics 
in a Polarized America, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. ___ (2018).
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than half the nation. The legitimacy of the Court has always been vulnera-
ble to accusations that having nine unelected judges overriding elected 
legislatures compromises basic democratic principles. McMahon asks 
whether the increasing incidence of these minority Justices might exacer-
bate this vulnerability.
Jason Mazzone likewise considers the Supreme Court’s institutional 
vulnerability and resilience, focusing on what happens when the Court
becomes the target of partisan attacks. Looking at recent congressional 
responses to Court rulings, he finds that even as the politicians turn up the 
rhetorical heat on the Court, they are frequently unable or unwilling to do 
much about it.28 Actual legislation aimed at the Court or its decisions, 
whether overrides of statutory rulings, attempts to limit the impact of con-
stitutional rulings, or regulation of the Court itself, is rarely successful. 
Congress, in other words, has more bark than bite when it comes to reign-
ing in the power of the Court. Mazzone’s analysis suggests that, even as 
attacks on the Court or individual Justices are prevalent in our political 
debates, the Court remains largely insulated from political checks.
Similarly, in his contribution to the Symposium, Christopher Schmidt 
argues that once we cut through the partisan rhetoric and drama of the 2016 
election, the way the candidates used the Supreme Court as a campaign 
issue remains largely unchanged from recent past elections.29 For all the 
extraordinary features of the 2016 presidential election, including the out-
sized role the Supreme Court appeared to have in the minds of many vot-
ers, possibly affecting the outcome of the election, the major party 
candidates themselves did relatively little to elevate the Court as a cam-
paign issue. Trump issued his list of potential Court nominees, the first 
presidential candidate to do so, and he regularly identified the Court as a 
reason to vote for him, but he showed little interest in talking about the 
Court at any length. Clinton did even less, than Trump, mentioning the 
Court only occasionally and usually only when prompted. Schmidt sug-
gests that one of the lessons of history that 2016 did not rewrite is that the 
Court as an issue can be a difficult fit for overt presidential campaigning.
Carolyn Shapiro looks at Supreme Court confirmation hearings, spe-
cifically at the senators questioning the nominees, and she finds reason for 
concern about the senators’ rhetoric.30 She identifies a growing disparity
between how Democrats and Republicans talk about the Court. Republi-
cans favor “process language,” which Shapiro describes as “focus[ing] on 
28. Mazzone, supra note 1.
29. Schmidt, supra note 4.
30. Shapiro, supra note 3.
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what judges are supposed to do, how they are supposed to be constrained, 
and how the constitutional separation of powers is supposed to work.”31
Democrats, on the other hand, particularly during Justice Gorsuch’s con-
firmation hearing, focus largely on the outcomes of judicial decisions, gen-
erally without addressing process. Shapiro argues that by failing to discuss 
the Court and the Constitution in process terms, Democrats have ceded 
critical ground, too often leaving unanswered Republicans claims that con-
servative constitutional jurisprudence is the only principled approach to 
judging.
Other contributors focus on the Justices’ role in the relationship be-
tween the Court and American politics. In their assessment of Justice Gor-
such’s confirmation hearings, Lori Ringhand and Paul Collins challenge 
Gorsuch’s defense of his refusal to discuss practically any Supreme Court 
precedents at his confirmation hearings as following the “rule” Justice 
Ginsburg articulated at her own confirmation hearings in 1993.32 Using
quantitative analysis, they demonstrate that Gorsuch’s unresponsiveness 
went well beyond Ginsburg’s and most previous nominees’. His refusal to 
meaningfully discuss not only those Court holdings that remain contested 
but also rulings that most assume to be firmly established canonical fixtures 
of the constitutional firmament, they warn, threatens the value of the con-
firmation hearing as a “high-profile public forum in which we as a nation 
affirm our shared constitutional commitments.”33 Ringhand and Collins 
also warn that if future nominees follow Gorsuch’s lead—and recent con-
firmation hearings of federal court judges indicate that this resistance to 
discussing any precedents may be trending34—then the people will have 
lost “an important tool in ensuring that the individuals selected to serve on 
the Supreme Court accept the constitutional settlements reached by each 
generation of Americans.”35
Other contributors focus on how the Justices decide cases involving 
political issues. In his keynote address, Rick Hasen dissects Justice Scalia’s 
views on when the political process malfunctions.36 He concludes that 
Scalia’s assessments of political self-dealing and incumbency protection 
31. Id. at [102].
32. Lori A. Ringhand & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Neil Gorsuch and the Ginsburg Rules, 93 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. ___ (2018).
33. Id. at [103].
34. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Dancing Away from Brown, ISCOTUSNOW (Apr. 15, 2018), 
http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/iscotus/dancing-away-brown/ [https://perma.cc/MN3B-4EDA].
35. Ringhand & Collins, supra note 32, at [103].
36. Richard L. Hasen, Keynote Address, Judging the Political and Political Judging: Justice 
Scalia as Case Study, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. ___ (2018).
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are too contradictory to explain his jurisprudence. Scalia is driven not by 
any consistent theory of democracy, Hasen argues, but instead by his ideo-
logical and partisan commitments—what Hasen terms his “conservative-
libertarian impulses.”37 Although there is nothing new about Justices’ ide-
ology playing a role in in deciding cases,38 what is new is that today on the 
Court ideology correlates with partisan affiliation: the most consistently 
liberal Justices were appointed by Democratic presidents, the most consist-
ently conservative by Republican presidents. This presents a new risk, 
Hasen warns. “Before long, if not already, voters likely will think of the 
Justices in more partisan terms, and of the Supreme Court as a Democratic 
Party or Republican Party-dominated institution.”39
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer also identifies a disconnect between what the 
Justices say and what they do in cases involving the political process.40
When explaining why they sometimes refuse to intervene in electoral poli-
tics, Justices regularly reference a concern with protecting the Court’s legit-
imacy.41 Citing a robust empirical literature on the resilience of the Court’s 
legitimacy despite controversial rulings, Fuentes-Rohwer argues that this 
expressed concern is, more often than not, simply a tool of judicial misdi-
rection. Justices plead legitimacy when they are really moved by their sub-
stantive opposition to the claim at issue.42 He warns of the costs when 
Justices deploy neutral principles to hide the ideological grounds of judicial 
decision making.43
In her contribution, Ann Southworth examines the aftermath of one of 
the most politically significant cases of recent decades, Citizens United.44
Like Hasen, she sees a polarized judiciary in a polarized country as cause 
for concern. In her interviews of lawyers who took different positions on 
the regulations struck down in Citizens United, she finds that opposing 
sides seem to inhabit different constitutional worlds when it comes to their 
views on the decision and its long-term consequences. In this way, lawyers 
37. Id. at [113] (citing Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 298 (2014)).
38. See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal 
Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79, 126–28 (2010).
39. Hasen, supra note 36, at [117].
40. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. ___ 
(2018).
41. Id. at [116] (citing Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on 
Supreme Court Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206, 207 (2012) (noting increasing Court references to 
judicial legitimacy in the years since Brown)).
42. Id. at [115–16].
43. Id. at [117–19].
44. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Ann Southworth, The Conse-
quences of Citizens United: What Do the Lawyers Say?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. ___ (2018).
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mirror the Justices wrote the decision itself.45 An ideologically polarized 
nation produces both a polarized bar and a polarized High Court.
What can be done? Some of the contributors who diagnose a dysfunc-
tion in the relationship between the Court and the American political sys-
tem propose a variety of fixes. Before long there will undoubtedly be
another Supreme Court confirmation battle. If it is to replace Justice Ken-
nedy, the swing vote in many of the most controversial cases in recent 
years, or any of the more liberal Justices, then we will be witnesses to what 
could be the most contentious confirmation battle in American history.46
Perhaps counterintuitively, several contributors urge us to think of this
looming battle as an opportunity, as a public moment for explicit discus-
sion of shared constitutional commitments. Thinking ahead to future hear-
ings, for example, Ringhand and Collins urge nominees to retain the 
approach that has characterized most past hearings: avoid talking about 
currently unsettled Court precedents but identify and accept canonical 
precedents. Nominees would avoid precommitting to issues they have not 
fully thought through in the context of adjudication, thus protecting judicial 
independence while also affirming “our shared constitutional commit-
ments.”47
Shapiro urges Democratic senators to contextualize the Court and its 
work in constitutional structure and principles.48 If, for example, as Maz-
zone suggests, overriding the Court’s statutory holdings is difficult, even
impossible, as a practical matter, it may be particularly important for sena-
tors to focus on whether a nominee’s approach to statutory interpretation is 
likely to undermine or support congressional enactments. “Democrats 
should not cede process language,” she argues. They “should insist on the 
political and legal left’s vision of the Constitution tied to its text, history, 
and principles.”49
Other contributors are less sanguine. Even if the relationship between 
the Court and the political system is dysfunctional, we might consider 
45. See ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 4 (2014) (describing the majority and minority in Citizens United as “seem[ing] to 
inhabit entirely different constitutional universes”).
46. See Ruth Marcus, Opinion, The Terrifying and Terrible Prospect of Justice Kennedy Retiring,
WASH. POST (June 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-terrifying-and-terrible-
prospect-of-justice-kennedy-retiring/2017/06/23/bc73ff9a-5830-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html? 
[http://perma.cc/LY3F-PJVE] (warning that Justice Kennedy’s retirement would “unleash nomination 
Armageddon”).
47. Ringhand & Collins, supra note 32, at [103].
48. Shapiro, supra note 3; see also Carolyn Shapiro, The Language of Neutrality in Supreme 
Court Confirmation Hearings, 122 DICKINSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
49. Shapiro, supra note 3, at [103].
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whether attempting to fix it would improve the situation. As Rick Hasen 
memorably puts it in his keynote address: “When all else fails, lower your 
expectations.”50 Hasen shows that in their election law jurisprudence, the 
Justices appear to be moved less by a coherent principle of electoral poli-
tics and the courts than by ideological commitments. Every time the Court 
delves into election law issues, it simply highlights the “political”—and 
even partisan—appearance of its rulings. The more involved the Justices 
are, the more “the public and other political branches will begin to see the 
Court as a more partisan institution, and less sophisticated individuals will 
believe, and cynical politicians across the aisle will push the argument, that 
these Justices are in fact engaged in tribal partisanship.”51 As a result, the 
political branches will treat the Court increasingly as simply another parti-
san lever, resulting in the loss of long-established norms in the political 
sphere respecting judicial independence. 
Schmidt offers his own version of Hasen’s “lower your expectations” 
recommendation. After assessing the less-than-inspiring history of how 
presidential candidates have used the Supreme Court as a campaign issue, 
he questions whether we really want presidential candidates to talk more 
about the Court on the campaign trail.
What’s the next chapter in this unfolding relationship between the 
Court and the American political system? How the Court and individual 
Justices act, rule, and write can affect how members of the public and other 
political actors view it. Politicians will continue to talk about and respond 
to the Court in our hyperpartisan times. Exploring the relationship between 
the Supreme Court and American politics is thus as necessary—and as 
interesting—as ever. The Articles in this symposium offer a range of per-
spectives on the topic, illuminating, critiquing, and contextualizing what 
often appears chaotic and unprecedented. Each makes a valuable contribu-
tion to our national conversation about the place of the Supreme Court in 
American politics.
50. Hasen, supra note 36, at 114 (emphasis omitted).
51. Id. at [116].
